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ABSTRACT
Computable General Equilibrium models, widely used for the analysis of Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs) are often criticized for having poor econometric foundations. This paper improves the
linkage between econometric estimates of key parameters and their usage in CGE analysis in order
to better evaluate the likely outcome of a FTA for the Americas. Our econometric work focuses on
estimation of the elasticity of substitution among imports from different countries, which is
especially critical for evaluating the positive and normative outcomes of FTAs. We match the data
in the econometric exercise to the policy experiment at hand. Then we sample from the distribution
of parameter values given by our econometric estimates in order to generate a distribution of model
results, from which we can construct confidence intervals. We conclude that there is great potential
for combining econometric work with CGE-based policy analysis in order to produce a richer set
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“The econometric cat was set among the pigeons when a second government-commissioned 
modelling study on the FTA was finally released… The second reason for the contradictory 
results is differing assumptions about an arcane economic relationship known as Armington 
elasticity.” (Financial Review, 2003) 
 
1.  Introduction 
With the proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) over the past decade, demand for 
quantitative analysis of their likely impacts has surged. The main quantitative tool for performing such 
analysis is Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling. Yet these models have been widely 
criticized for performing poorly (Kehoe, 2002) and having weak econometric foundations (McKitrick, 
1998; Jorgenson, 1984).  FTA results have been shown to be particularly sensitive to assumptions on 
the price elasticity of export demand (henceforth, the trade elasticity).  As will be demonstrated in 
Section 2, small trade elasticities generate large terms of trade effects by reducing the responsiveness 
of export demand.  On the other hand, small trade elasticities reduce the likelihood of trade diversion, 
as import sourcing becomes less sensitive to relative prices.  Of course, large trade elasticities lead to 
the opposite results. Critics are understandably wary of results being determined largely by the 
authors’ choice of trade elasticities. Indeed, the sensitivity of welfare results to the choice of trade 
elasticities has even surfaced in the popular press as witnessed in the opening quotation to this paper.
1  
Where do these trade elasticities come from?  CGE modelers typically draw the elasticities 
from econometric work that uses time series price variation to identify an elasticity of substitution 
between domestic goods and composite imports (Alaouze, 1977; Alaouze, Marsden, and Zeitsch, 
1977; Stern et al., 1976; Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera, 2003).  This approach has three problems: 
the use of point estimates as “truth”, downward bias in the magnitude of the point estimates created by 
problems in the estimation technique, and a mis-match between the data sample and source of 
variation in the econometric exercise and the policy experiment explored in the CGE exercise.   
                                                 
1  In this article, two studies of the Australia-USA FTA are discussed, one which reports a gain, and one which 
reports a loss. Differing assumptions about the benefits of services liberalization was the first reason identified, 
while the second difference for the contradictory results was identified as the assumptions about the Armington 
elasticities.   2
First, modelers take point estimates drawn from the econometric literature, while ignoring the 
precision of these estimates.  As we will make clear below, the confidence one has in various CGE 
conclusions depends critically on the size of the confidence interval around parameter estimates.  
Standard “robustness checks” such as systematically raising or lowering the substitution parameters 
fail to properly address this problem because they ignore information about which parameters we 
know with some precision and which we do not. 
A second problem with most existing studies derives from the use of import price series to 
identify home vs. foreign substitution.  This approach tends to systematically understate the true 
elasticity because these estimates take price variation as exogenous when estimating the import 
demand functions, and ignore quality variation.  When quality is high, import demand and prices will 
be jointly high.  This biases estimated elasticities toward zero.  A related point is that the fixed-weight 
import price series used by most authors are theoretically inappropriate for estimating the elasticities 
of interest.  CGE modelers generally examine a nested utility structure, with domestic production 
substituting for a CES composite import bundle.  The appropriate price series is then the 
corresponding CES price index among foreign varieties.  Constructing such an index requires 
knowledge of the elasticity of substitution among foreign varieties (see below).  By using a fixed-
weight import price series, previous estimates place too much weight on high foreign prices, and too 
small a weight on low foreign prices.  In other words, they overstate the degree of price variation that 
exists, relative to a CES price index.  Reconciling small trade volume movements with large import 
price series movements requires a small elasticity of substitution.  This problem, and that of 
unmeasured quality variation, helps explain why typical estimated elasticities are very small. 
The third problem with the existing literature is that estimates taken from other researchers’ 
studies typically employ different levels of aggregation, and exploit different sources of price 
variation, from what policy modelers have in mind.  Employment of elasticities in experiments ill-
matched to their original estimation can be problematic.  For example, estimates may be calculated at   3
a higher or lower level of aggregation than the level of analysis than the modeler wants to examine.  
Estimating substitutability across sources for paddy rice gives one a quite different answer than 
estimates that look at agriculture as a whole.  In addition, when analyzing Free Trade Agreements, the 
principle policy experiment is a change in relative prices among foreign suppliers caused by lowering 
tariffs within the FTA.  Understanding the substitution this will induce across those suppliers is critical 
to gauging the FTA’s real effects.  Using home vs. foreign elasticities rather than elasticities of 
substitution among imports supplied from different countries may be quite misleading.  Moreover, 
these “sourcing” elasticities are critical for constructing composite import price series to appropriate 
estimate home vs. foreign substitutability. 
In summary, the history of estimating the substitution elasticities governing trade flows in 
CGE models has been checkered at best. Yet they are central to the welfare results of such studies. 
Clearly there is a need for improved econometric estimation of these trade elasticities that is well-
integrated into the CGE modeling framework.  This paper provides such estimation and integration, 
and has several significant merits.  First, we choose our experiment carefully.  Our CGE analysis 
focuses on the prospective Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) currently under 
negotiation. This is one of the most important FTAs currently “in play” in international negotiations. It 
also fits nicely with the source data used to estimate the trade elasticities, which is largely based on 
world-wide imports into North and South America. Our assessment is done in a perfectly competitive, 
comparative static setting in order to emphasize the role of the trade elasticities in determining the 
conventional gains/losses from such an FTA.  As highlighted by the quotation at the start of this paper, 
this type of model is still widely used by government agencies for the evaluation of such agreements.  
In fact, the GTAP model (Hertel 1997) which we employ in this paper is actively used in dozens of 
public research institutions around the world.  Extensions to incorporate imperfect competition are 
straightforward, but involve the introduction of additional parameters (markups, extent of unexploited   4
scale economies) as well as structural assumptions (entry/no-entry, nature of inter-firm rivalry) that 
introduce further uncertainty. 
Since our focus is on the effects of a preferential FTA we estimate elasticities of substitution 
across multiple foreign supply sources.  We do not use cross-exporter variation in prices or tariffs 
alone.  Exporter price series exhibit a high degree of multicolinearity, and in any case, would be 
subject to unmeasured quality variation as described previously.  Similarly, tariff variation by itself is 
typically unhelpful because by their very nature, Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs are non-
discriminatory, affecting all suppliers in the same way. Tariff preferences, where they exist, are often 
difficult to measure – sometimes being confounded by quantitative barriers, rules of origin, and other 
restrictions. Instead we employ a unique data set drawing on not only tariffs, but also bilateral 
transportation costs for goods traded internationally (Hummels, 1999). Transportation costs vary much 
more widely than do tariffs, allowing more precise estimation of the trade elasticities that are central to 
CGE analysis of FTAs.   We have highly disaggregated commodity trade flow data, and are therefore 
able to provide estimates that precisely match the commodity aggregation scheme employed in the 
subsequent CGE model. We follow the GTAP Version 5.0 aggregation scheme which includes 42 
merchandise trade commodities covering food products, natural resources and manufactured goods. 
With the exception of two primary commodities that are not traded, we are able to estimate trade 
elasticities for all merchandise commodities that are significantly different form zero at the 95% 
confidence level.  
Rather than producing point estimates of the resulting welfare effects, we report confidence 
intervals instead. These are based on repeated solution of the model, drawing from a distribution of 
trade elasticity estimates constructed based on the econometrically estimated standard errors. There is 
now a long history of CGE studies based on SSA: Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (Harrison and 
Vinod, 1992; Wigle, 1991; Pagon and Shannon, 1987) However, to date, all of these studies have 
taken their parameter distributions “from the literature”. None of these studies has been accompanied   5
by an econometric study in which the key parameters and their distributions are estimated using data 
samples and variation that closely match the policy experiment considered in the CGE analysis.  
For this paper, we use the Gaussian Quadrature (GQ) approach to SSA, which has proven to 
be the most efficient and unbiased approach to systematically assessing the sensitivity of model results 
to parametric uncertainty (DeVuyst and Preckel, 1997; Arndt, 1996). We find that many of the results 
are qualitatively robust to uncertainty in the trade elasticities. In those cases where our findings are not 
robust, we explore the source of underlying uncertainty. In this way, the paper addresses the 
fundamental question: How Robust Are CGE Analyses of Free Trade Agreements? 
 
2.  Explaining Welfare Changes:  The Role of Trade Elasticities 
Due to the centrality of the trade elasticities to our argument, we begin by specifying the 
nested CES import demands.  Expenditure on each composite commodity i in region s, Eis, is 
determined in general equilibrium by a combination of demand for the composite commodity in 
private consumption, public consumption, investment demand and intermediate input demand. 
Therefore, for purposes of partial equilibrium estimation, we treat this expenditure level as exogenous, 
and focus on changes in its composition. The composite commodities are modeled as being a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function of domestic and imported goods (1), and, at the second level 
of this preference structure, imports from different countries are combined in a CES function (2):  
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Here, the index s denotes the importing region, QCis is utility of consuming composite commodity i in 
this region, while QDis is utility from domestically produced i, and QMis is utility from composite 
imports (obtained from equation (2)). The parameters βDis and βMis represent import-specific 
preference weights on domestic versus imported goods, and ϕi is the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and imported sources of good i in region s. We assume that this elasticity is equal across 
regions.  In a similar fashion, the composite demand for imports (2) is a CES function of bilateral 
imports of i, sourced from different exporting regions r: QMSirs where the birs is the associated 
preference weight and σi is the elasticity of substitution among imports from different exporters. 
Again, we assume that this elasticity is identical across regions.   
To determine aggregate demand for imports of commodity i into region s, the importing 
region maximizes (1), conditional on aggregate commodity expenditure for each commodity Eis, 
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where the composite commodity price index is given by:  
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The optimal sourcing of imports from different exporters is obtained by maximizing (2), conditional 
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Changes in welfare in response to an FTA may be decomposed using the method of Huff and 
Hertel (1996), who provide an analytical decomposition of the Equivalent Variation (EV) for the 
representative household in region s.
 2 It is similar in spirit to that of Baldwin and Venables (1995), 
however, unlike the latter decomposition, it allows for non-homothetic preferences, domestic taxes 
and subsidies, and, most importantly, it assumes products are differentiated by origin (the Armington 
assumption). This decomposition is also implemented numerically to decompose non-local welfare 
changes. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the case where there are no export taxes, and domestic 
taxes are applied only to consumption and production.  (This assumption will be relaxed in the 
empirical analysis.)   As we will show, the elasticity of substitution is a key parameter determining 
both positive responses to the FTAA as well as their normative implications. 
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where the subscript ί is indexed over the traded commodities, r denotes source region and s refers to 
the importing region.   s ψ  is a scaling factor which is normalized to one initially, but changes as a 
                                                 
2 The Huff-Hertel EV decomposition is obtained by starting with the equation for regional income as a function 
of endowment income, plus taxes less subsidies.  Into this equation, they substitute the general equilibrium 
conditions for zero profits, price linkages, and market clearing for tradeables and non-tradeables.  They deflate 
income by deducting the appropriate price index from both sides of the equation, thereby obtaining equation (3)   8
function of the marginal cost of utility in the presence of non-homothetic preferences (McDougall, 
2002).   
The first four summations on the right-hand side (RHS) of (7) measure the changes in 
efficiency of resource utilization in region s.  These involve the interaction of tax/subsidy distortions 
with the change in associated quantities.  Consider what happens when we eliminate the bilateral tariff 
on imports of commodity i from one of the FTAA partner countries. The relevant term appears in the 
first summation: 
() irs irs Mirs irs dQMS PCIF WQMS τ =                                                                                                      (8) 
Here, ( irs MirsPCIF τ ) is the per unit tariff revenue on imports of good i from r into s, associated with 
the ad valorem tariff rate  Mirs τ .   This is multiplied by the change in the volume of imports of i from r 
into s:  irs dQMS .  The “Harberger triangle” that we are measuring with this term may be seen in Figure 
1. In order to evaluate the area of this triangle as the tariff is eliminated, we must consider both the 
“base” ( irs MirsPCIF τ ) and the “height” ( irs dQMS ).  By continually reevaluating the base of this triangle 
as we solve the CGE model, we track the diminishing gap between PCIF and PMS.  In this way, we 
are able to accurately measure its area, which is then added to the aggregate welfare measure.   
In order to properly perform the numerical integration depicted in Figure 1, equation (7) must 
be solved in conjunction with the CGE model, using appropriate solution procedures.  We use version 
8 of the GEMPACK software suite (Harrison and Pearson, 1996; 2002) which is ideally suited to this 
problem, as it solves the non-linear CGE model using a linearized version of the behavioral equations, 
coupled with updated equations that link the change (e.g.,  irs dQMS ) and levels (e.g.,  irs QMS )   9
variables.  Standard extrapolation techniques can be used to obtain arbitrarily accurate solutions to any 
well-posed problem (Harrison and Pearson, 1996; 2002).
3 
Note from equation (7) we see that, in addition to tariffs, we consider volume interactions with 
consumption taxes on household purchases of both domestic goods ( CDis τ ) and imported goods 
( CMis τ ).  Taxes (or subsidies) on output also play a role.  If  Ois τ < 0, then the production of commodity 
i in region s is subsidized and an expansion of output ( is qo > 0) will contribute negatively to efficiency 
and hence to EV.  The absence of terms associated with intermediate input taxes, as well as primary 
factor taxes, mean that we are assuming these taxes are zero in this stylized example.  (In the empirical 
section below, this assumption will be relaxed.) 
The final two terms on the RHS of (7) refer to the terms of trade (TOT) effects for region s.  
These determine how the global efficiency gains are shared amongst regions.  If region s’s export-
weighted FOB prices rise, relative to her import -weighted CIF prices, then the TOT will improve.  
Since one region’s export prices are another region’s import prices, the improved TOT for region s 
translates into a TOT deterioration in the rest of the world (taken as a group). 
In summary, each region’s welfare gains can be decomposed into a terms of trade and an 
allocative efficiency component. The essence of the FTAA experiment involves eliminating the trade 
taxes within the block, i.e.,  i Mik ∀ = , 0 A τ  and  FTAA k ∈ ∀ A , .  This, in turn, induces a shift in the 
sourcing of imports, away from exporters outside the block and towards exporters within the block.  
As seen from (5), the extent of this shifting depends on the Armington elasticity of substitution,  i σ .  
Log differentiating (5) and (6), and converting to percent changes (lower case denotes the percentage 
change in the associated upper case levels variables), we obtain the following two equations 
describing import sourcing in region s: 
                                                 
3 For purposes of this paper, we require that 95% of the variables and levels variables are accurate to four digits.  
Another useful check is to compare EVs computed from equation (3) with that computed directly from the utility 
function.  These match, to machine accuracy.   10




is pms pm Θ =∑
=
                                                                                                           (10) 
where  () irs irs irs pcif tm pms + = , and  irs tm  is the percentage change in ( ) Mirs τ + 1 .  The coefficient 
and  irs Θ  is the expenditure share of total imports of i into s that is sourced from region r. 
Now, if we assume, for the sake of exposition, that there are no domestic taxes whatsoever, 
then we can convert the simple changes in equation (7) into percentage changes, thereupon 
substituting in equations (9) – (10) to obtain the following decomposition of the local change in 
welfare of region s: 
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where  () = = irs irs Mirs irs QMS PCIF TR τ tariff revenue on commodity i imported from r into s.  Provided 
region s is small, relative to supplier markets, it will have little impact on import prices (pcifirs ≅ 0).  
However, even a small country can have a substantial impact on its own export prices in this 
differentiated product framework, so pfobisr ≠0.  The size of the export price changes will be 
determined by the export demand elasticity, which approaches -σi for a country that is small in its 
export markets () 0 ≅ Θisr  (recall equations 9 and 10).   
   11
This decomposition makes clear why, in our econometric exercise, we focus so intently on σi , the 
elasticity of substitution among imports.  The welfare consequences of a single, small economy’s FTA 
measures will depend first and foremost on the value of σi , . Large values of σi will cause the elements 
of the first term in (11) to become larger in absolute value, as the shift in import sourcing becomes 
more pronounced.  On the other hand, large values for σi serve to increase the export demand elasticity 
facing region s, thereby dampening the change in export price.
4   
It is the first term in equation (11) which determines whether or not trade diversion or trade 
creation takes place in this FTA.  If, for example, σi= 0 , then the pattern of import sourcing will 
remain unchanged and the sole effect of lower tariffs will be to lower the cost of composite imports 
(equation (10)), thereby leading to an increased demand for imports ( ) 0 > = is irs qm qms , by equation 





is s QMS PCIF qm τ ψ ∑ ∑
= = 1 1
.  This is the case of 
pure trade creation.  
In practice, we expect the value of σi to be quite large—a point confirmed by the econometric 
work reported below.  This means that the second part of equation (9) will be dominant in the 
determination of  irs qms .  In this situation, the key issue is how the changes in bilateral imports, 
irs qms , correlate with bilateral tariff revenues.  Clearly, if the preferential FTA eliminates tariffs on 
flows that are already lightly taxed (lower average tariff revenue), then there will be potential for trade 
diversion, as the bilateral import changes will be negatively correlated with tariff revenue (i.e., 
irs qms > when  0 ≅ irs TR  and  0 < irs qms  for  0 >> irs TR ).  In the ensuing empirical analysis of the 
FTAA, we will examine this trade creation/diversion effect in all participating countries.  We will also 
explore its sensitivity to the econometrically estimated uncertainty in σi, a topic to which we now turn. 
                                                 
4 Since in the FTAA one country’s exports represent another country’s imports, and the terms of trade for any 
specific country will be determined by the complex interaction between the specific pattern of bilateral tariff cuts 
and the existing pattern of bilateral trade flaws.    12
 
3.  Econometric Specification and Estimation of Trade Elasticities  
Our econometric estimation focuses on the second level of the two-level, Armington structure, 
since we will be examining the impact of a proposed preferential FTA, and the key parameter is σi, the 
elasticity of substitution among imports from different sources for a given commodity.
5 We begin by 
introducing the power of the trade cost for an imported commodity, Tirs, which equals one plus the ad 
valorem rates for freight, insurance and tariff, which are all commodity- and route-specific: 
irs irs Mirs Firs irs tariff freight T + + = + + = 1 ) 1 ( τ τ , so the domestic cost of imports is given by 
irs irs irs PFOB T PMS = .  Because it is difficult to observe the quantity of demand, we multiply both 



















                                                                                   (12) 
which by taking natural logarithm results in an easily estimated equation (13). 
irs i irs i is i ir i irs irs b T PM PFOB I V ln ln ) 1 ( ln ) 1 ( ln ) 1 ( ln ln σ σ σ σ + − + − − − + =      (13) 
It is commonly observed that countries with similar languages and cultures trade more with 
one another than would be predicted solely on the basis of trade costs. The preference parameters  irs b  
are intended to capture these effects. To reduce the number of unobserved variables in the estimating 
equation, we model these preference biases explicitly, treating them as a function of physical distance: 
Dist, similarity of language: Lang, and adjacency of the trading countries: Adj. The specific functional 
relationship is as follows:  
ri s ri s s Adj Lang
rs irs e Dist b
, 3 , 2 , 1 β β β + =                        (14) 
                                                 
5 It is also the case that the data set that we have available only covers imports, and therefore does not lend itself 
to estimation of the upper level nest.  
   13
Substituting (14) into (13), we obtain the following: 
rs i rs i ri i irs irs i
is i ir i irs irs
Adj Lang Dist tariff freight
PM PFOB I V
, 3 , 2 , 1 ln ) 1 ln( ) 1 (
ln ) 1 ( ln ) 1 ( ln ln
β β β σ
σ σ
+ + + + + − +
− − − + =
                  (15) 
Data on prices, the price index, output, and expenditure shares are difficult to obtain, and in 
any case, endogenous.  All of these variables are therefore omitted in the model and replaced with 
importer and exporter of commodity i intercepts a: air = 1 if country r is an exporter of commodity i, 
otherwise it is 0; ais = 1 if country s is an importer of commodity i, otherwise it is 0. The final 
estimating equation is (16): 
      irs rs i rs i rs i sri sri i ir is irs Adj Lang Dist tariff freight a a a V ε β β β β + + + + + + + + + = , 3 , 2 , 1 0 ln ) 1 ln( ln        
(16)         
where  i i σ β − =1 .                                                                                                                  
 
4.  Data and Elasticity Estimates 
The data used in estimation are taken from Hummels (1999). Given the emphasis in this study 
on the FTAA, it is appropriate that these data are a compilation of detailed customs information on 
imports into six FTAA countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, USA, and Uruguay) and one 
non-FTAA economy (New Zealand). In order to estimate equation (16) we also require data on 
physical distance among the countries as well as comprehensive tariff data
6. The final dataset contains 
187,000 observations with the following variables: 5-digit SITC code of the commodity traded, fob 
and cif values for each trade flow, applied tariff rates, trade distance and two dummy variables to 
indicate common language or countries’ adjacency. In addition, we dropped extreme observations 
where trade costs were either non-positive or greater than 4 times the fob value of the product traded. 
                                                 
6 For more information see the appendix in Hummels (1999).   14
At this point we face an interesting choice. We could aggregate the 5-digit, SITC trade flows 
and trade costs according to the 42 GTAP merchandise commodity groups used in our CGE model 
(Table 1).  The advantage of this aggregation approach is that it exactly matches the data variation 
contained in the CGE exercise (i.e. a single value of trade for each bilateral pair in each of the 42 
commodity groups).  An alternative approach retains the variation across bilateral pairs and 5-digit 
level commodities within each of the 42 GTAP categories, constraining the elasticity of substitution to 
be equal within each broad sector. The main advantage of the pooling approach is that it provides 
greater within-sector variation in tariffs and transport costs which is critical for identifying the relevant 
substitution elasticities.  We employ the pooling technique in order to yield more precise estimates.  
7 
The results of Ordinary Least Squares estimation of equation (14) are presented in Table 1. 
Note that all of these estimates are positive and are significantly different from zero. Based on a 
simple t-test, each of the 40 estimated elasticities of substitution allow us to reject the hypothesis that 
the estimated elasticity is zero at the 95% confidence level.  
Table 1 also contrasts these estimates with the original elasticities of substitution among 
imports from the GTAP database.
8 (Note that estimates are not available for two GTAP products 
which are non-traded: raw sugar and raw milk. We assign these GTAP commodities the estimated 
elasticity of substitution associated with trade in processed sugar and milk, respectively.) As noted 
previously, the GTAP parameters are widely used in the analysis of FTAs.
9 If we compute the simple 
average of the 40 estimates it is 7.0, which is somewhat larger than the average for the 42 GTAP 
parameters (5.3). Although these two averages are fairly similar, there is much greater sectoral 
variation in the econometrically estimated elasticities. In fact, the most striking thing about the GTAP 
parameters is that they show no variability within broad sectors such as food and agriculture, and 
                                                 
7 In the results section, we also discuss the results obtained from using the aggregation approach. 
8 The GTAP parameter file was taken from the SALTER project (Jomini et al., 1994). These trade elasticities are 
based on a synthesis of estimates from the literature and original econometric work for one country – New 
Zealand 
9 For a sampling of these applications, visit the GTAP web: www.gtap.org).   15
metal products. This is because the source studies were not conducted at a sufficiently disaggregate 
level.
10  
5.  Application to the FTAA  
Background: The recent growth of free trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere began in 
the 1980s as Latin American countries initiated significant trade and economic policy reforms. It was 
accelerated in the 1990’s with the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
Over the past two decades, more than forty regional or bilateral trade agreements have been 
implemented within the hemisphere. In fact, every country except Cuba has been party to at least one 
such agreement.  With the rapid growth of free trade agreements among countries, the idea for the 
FTAA arose as a logical next step in the economic integration of the hemisphere.  A more 
encompassing agreement also provides a way of simplifying the complex network of existing FTA and 
bilateral agreements in place (Diao and Somwaru, 2001). Two of these, the NAFTA and the Common 
Market of the South (MERCOSUR) are among the largest FTAs in the world.  
The FTAA effort was initiated in December of 1994 as leaders of the thirty-four democracies 
in the Western Hemisphere met in Miami for the “Summit of the Americas”. After a four year 
preparatory process, negotiations were launched in April 1998 in Santiago Chile, with the goal of 
achieving substantial progress by 2000 and completing the negotiations by 2005. The most recent 
ministerial meeting of the FTAA was held in Miami in November 2003, and the deadline of 
September 30, 2004 was established for conclusion of the negotiations over market access. This 
resulted in ministerial declarations that largely reaffirmed the FTAA and its commitment to be 
implemented on time and in a consistent manner with WTO rules (FTAA Tri-Partite Commission 
2002; 2003). 
                                                 
10 It is also striking to observe that the largest elasticity of substitution is for natural gas (34.4) and the lowest is 
for other mineral products (1.8), yet for the GTAP model, both of these products are assigned the value of 5.6, 
corresponding to the generic estimate for natural resource products.    16
Given the focus on merchandise trade in the Americas, and in light of the large dimensions of 
the GTAP data base, which we use as the empirical basis for our simulations, we begin by aggregating 
the sixty-six regions of the version 5.0 GTAP database to seventeen regions.  (See Appendix Table 
A.1).  Full GTAP country detail is preserved in the Western Hemisphere, while composite regions are 
formed for the rest of the world, including: Asia-Oceania (ASOC), the fifteen-member European 
Union (EU15), rest of Europe (OEUR), and Middle East and Africa (MEAF). In order to further 
reduce the dimensions of this model, services activities are also aggregated into four broad categories. 
A fair assessment of the changes that occur due to liberalization under the FTAA requires updating the 
GTAP 5.0 database benchmark data to account for the pre-existing applied tariff structure in the 
liberalizing regions – in particular taking account of preferential trade agreements in the Western 
Hemisphere (see Appendix Table A2). 
Simulation and SSA: The simulation experiment undertaken here is a stylized representation 
of an FTAA scenario.  It involves reducing all tariffs on intra-regional trade for the forty-two 
merchandise trade commodities to zero.  While this is not likely to be a politically feasible scenario, 
this serves as a useful benchmark that represents an upper bound on the potential gains from 
liberalization (Young and Huff, 1998).  
As noted in the introduction, the centerpiece of this study involves the systematic sensitivity 
analysis of the results with respect to the estimated trade elasticities. This is most commonly done via 
Monte Carlo analysis, where, the model is solved many times using a random sample of substitution 
elasticities, drawn from the empirical distribution of estimated trade elasticities. In many cases Monte 
Carlo is impractical for a large CGE model owing to the large dimension of a multiregional model and 
the large number of solutions required to approximate the distribution of the uncertain parameters 
(Arndt, 1996).  The recently developed Gaussian Quadrature approach of DeVuyst and Preckel (1997) 
provides an attractive alternative. These authors show that an approximate distribution can be obtained 
based on known lower order moments of the parameters of a model, and that selectively solving the   17
model based on the moments of this approximate distribution generates sensitivity results consistent 
with those of the Monte Carlo approach, with much more efficient use of computing time. The 
Gaussian Quadrature technique is employed here for generating sensitivity results to the trade 
elasticities. 
We must now invoke some assumptions about the underlying parameter distributions.  First, 
we assume that they are independently and normally distributed. Secondly, the elasticity of 
substitution in the domestic-import substitution nest (recall ϕi  in equation 1) is assumed to be tied to 
σi via the “rule of two” so that these elasticities vary together and by the same proportion in repeated 
solutions of the model.
11 
 
6.  Results   
The results of our simulation may be reported in a number of ways. First of all, since we use 
distributions, rather than point estimates for the trade elasticities, our results also come in the form of 
distributions. Therefore, the most natural thing to look at is the mean value for each variable of 
interest, along with the associated standard deviation, or the coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation/mean). This information, accompanied with an assumption regarding the shape of the 
underlying distribution of endogenous variables (we assume normality as with the parameters) allows 
formation of confidence intervals for welfare changes as well as other model results, and thus the 
ability to address the question at the focus of this paper: How confident can we be in the CGE-based 
analyses of Free Trade Agreements?  
Our approach to analyzing the results in this paper will be to investigate the elements of 
equation (7) individually, thereafter examining their combined impact on welfare.  We begin with the 
                                                 
11 The “rule of two” links ϕs with the estimated value for σi as follows: σi = 2ϕi. This rule was first proposed by 
Jomini et al. (1994) and was retained in the GTAP parameter file. Recently this rule was tested by Liu, Arndt and 
Hertel (2002) in a back-casting exercise with a simplified version of the GTAP model. While those authors reject 
the validity of the GTAP trade elasticities, they fail to reject the rule of two, thereby lending additional support to 
this approach.   18
tariff-related efficiency effect.  Since this is driven by changes in import volume, let us first consider 
what happens to imports.  Table 2 reports the mean percentage change in regional import volume as a 
result of the FTAA experiment. Aggregate import volume increases in all FTAA regions, while falling 
in the non-FTAA regions. Furthermore, 95% confidence intervals, constructed based on the 
assumption of normality, show that we can be confident in all of these increases. The largest increases 
are for Colombia and the Other Central America.  Our 95% confidence intervals for these two 
countries do not overlap with that of Peru, which shows the third largest increase in total imports. 
These large increases in imports may be directly attributed to the relatively larger tariff rates for these 
countries.  Most of the aggregate import volume changes are between +4% and +9%, with some 
exceptions.  The US and Canada, which already enjoy free trade with one another, show a smaller 
increase in imports. Also, there is a very low import volume increase for Uruguay. This can be 
attributed to the relative loss of preferential access that occurs under FTAA when partners in 
MERCOSUR liberalize with other regions in the Americas.  
One interesting question that arises in the context of our SSA is whether there is greater 
certainty about more aggregate variables than about disaggregate variables produced by this model. 
The last two columns in Table 2 address this issue in the case of import volumes. First we report the 
coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation divided by the mean) for the change in 
national imports (this is the change reported in column 4 of Table 2). When this ratio is small, we can 
infer a relatively higher level of confidence in the result. Note that it is quite small for Chile, whereas 
it reaches its maximum value in the case of the rest of the Andean Pact (XAP). The final column in 
Table 2 reports the average coefficient of variation for the percentage change in national imports, at 
the sector level. This gives an indication of the average degree of precision for the more disaggregate 
results. As can be seen by comparing these two entries for each country, the more disaggregate results 
are less precise. This is intuitive in that we often expect a certain degree of offset at the aggregate level 
(when one sector’s imports are low, another’s may be high).    19
Next, turn to the allocative efficiency effects associated with the import volume changes.  
These are reported in the first column of Table 3, which gives both the mean and the coefficient of 
variation (CV) associated with the tariff-related allocative efficiency component of equation (3).  
Recall that this is the (welfare-scaled) summation of the tariff revenue-weighted import quantity 
changes.  From the mean values of this variable, we see that there is net “trade creation” for 10 of the 
13 FTAA partners.  In the cases of Venezuela, Chile and the Other South America, this import 
efficiency term is negative, despite the fact that aggregate import volume rises (recall Table 2).  This is 
due to the fact that the welfare contribution of the trade volume change depends on the interaction 
between tariff rates and trade flows.  As tariffs are eliminated on intra-FTAA flows, the associated 
welfare weight is eliminated.  If the remaining tariffs on extra-FTAA imports are large, and if the 
associated FTAA-driven decline in the trade volume is also large, these negative numbers can 
dominate the overall welfare effect, leading to trade diversion.   
Table 4 explores this trade diversion phenomenon in detail for the case of machinery and 
equipment imports into Chile.  Chile is notable for is its uniform tariff structure (8% across all 
sources/products in 2001).  This is efficient in that it promotes the sourcing of imports from the least 
cost supplies of any given product, as well as discouraging substitution across import categories in 
response to differential tariffs by product.  Of course, there remains the distortion of import/domestic 
choices, as with any tariff regime.  We focus the discussion here on other machinery and equipment 
imports because this contributes the largest share of the aggregate efficiency loss in column one of 
Table 3 (one-third of the total). 
The individual columns in Table 4 correspond to different parts of equation (4).  The first 
entry reports the non-linear solution value for EVs ( Mirs τ ) for ome i = , s = Chile and r = all regions.
12  
                                                 
12 Note that the non-linear solution to equation (9) requires that we incorporate it individually into the model’s 
solution (as apposed to it being a part of equation (3)).  This permits us to capture the interaction between 
changes in the levels of  irs M τ  and PCIFirs on the one hand, and the volume changes, 
irs dQMS , on the other.   20
The driving force behind each of these entries is the underlying change in bilateral import 
volume, irs dQMS  reported in column two of the table.  This is measured in $US 1997, where one unit 
of the good is the amount that could be purchased in the source country for $1.00 in the initial (i.e., 
pre-FTAA) equilibrium.  Since these goods are differentiated products, the sum of these trade volumes 
is not particularly meaningful.  But if we did perform this summation, we would find that this crude 
estimate of import volume showed an increase of $214 million, with the rises in intra-FTAA imports 
of machinery and equipment into Chile more than offsetting the declines in extra-FTAA imports.  This 
naïve estimate of increased import volume stands in sharp contrast to the negative welfare outcome 
share in the first column total. 
The difference between the simple volume summation and the welfare change derives from 
the bilateral weights applied to these volume changes:   Mirs τ PCIFirs.  In this regard, it is instructive to 
consider both the initial (0) and ending (1) values for the tariff rate and import price.  These are also 
reported in Table 4.  Note that the proportional PCIFirs changes (typically less than 10%) are an order 
of magnitude smaller than the changes in intra-regional tariffs (-100%), so we focus our attention on 
the latter.  While the initial reductions in the tariff on intra-FTAA imports bring fairly large welfare 
gains, (recall Figure 1), the final reductions bring almost nothing.  Yet, the final reduction in  Mirs τ  
continues to lead to substantial displacement of extra-FTAA imports (recall equation (5)).  Given the 
absence of reductions on the extra-FTAA tariffs, these volume reductions come to dominate the 
welfare story.  This is why the welfare loss due to reduced imports of machinery and equipment from 
the EU is nearly twice as large as the gain due to increased imports from USA, even though the 
absolute value of the trade volume change with respect to USA is nearly twice that of the EU. 
Recall from our earlier analysis (e.g., equation 11) that the elasticity of substitution among 
imports, by source, is a critical determinant of the allocative efficiency effect associated with tariff 
changes. Yet these elasticities are uncertain, and we have characterized this uncertainty in our   21
systematic sensitivity analysis. So it is of some interest to explore the relationship between uncertainty 
in the trade elasticities and uncertainty in these welfare contribution terms themselves. We examine 
this issue statistically for the welfare changes associated with FTAA flows in the model.  Consider the 
welfare term in equation (8),  irs WQMS .  In a typical CGE analysis, there is but one value of this term 
for each commodity i,  exporter r, and importer s.  However, in our approach, we have a value for this 
term for each solution of the model, every time with a different set of trade elasticities.  To better 
understand the standard error in  irs WQMS  across model solutions, we regress the standard error in this 
variable on the depth of the associated bilateral tariff cut, irs τ , which is the same across model 
solutions), and an interaction between the depth of the tariff cut and   i SEσ , the standard error of the 
substitution elasticity among imports by source, for commodity i. We include the depth of the tariff cut 
as an explanatory variable to control for differences in relative dispersion in the welfare contribution 
variable, because larger tariff cuts will increase variability of the welfare variable for a constant 
standard error for the elasticity.  Estimates are reported in equation (17)
13, along with the associated T-
statistics (in parentheses): 
i irs irs WQIMirs SE SE σ τ τ
) 936 . 6 ( ) 464 . 6 (
023 . 0 020 . 0 + =           ( 1 7 )  
  The OLS coefficients in (17) are significant and positive indicating that both the depth of the 
tariff reduction and the interaction of the tariff with the variability of the elasticity are important in 
explaining variability in the allocative welfare effects. The positive relationship is as we would expect, 
since we hypothesize that uncertainty in the model parameter should be carried over to the allocative 
welfare component as demonstrated in section 2.  
                                                 
13 The regression is based on 5,337 non-zero bilateral trade flows in the FTAA region. The R
2 for the regression 
is 0.040, indicating fairly low explanatory power as we would expect given the large number of omitted 
variables (in the regression model) that affect the welfare term in the GE model. Since our primary concern is to 
characterize the relationship between uncertainty in the welfare term and the trade elasticity we feel the 
regression model is serviceable as it controls for the dominant effect of size of the tariff cut, and shows the 
significant positive relationship between the two measures of uncertainty.   22
The coefficient levels indicate that we predict a change of 0.043 in the standard error of the 
welfare variable when the tariff cut is increased by one percent and the standard error of the 
substitution elasticity is increased by one. The mean standard error for the allocative welfare effect is 
0.163, so this predicted change represents about twenty-five percent of the mean for the dependent 
variable. 
We now return to Table 3 to discuss the remaining elements of the efficiency story.  For Chile, 
the next most important efficiency change relates to the consumption taxes,
14 which apply equally to 
consumption of imports and domestic goods.  Thus, the increased consumption of imported goods 
boosts overall consumption and results in positive contributions to aggregate welfare in all of the 
FTAA regions where good consumption taxation data are available.
15  Production taxes (subsidies) 
also play a big role in the welfare decomposition in some regions.  In USA, the strong expansion of 
subsidized grains output leads to a negative welfare contribution, whereas in Mexico, the expansion of 
taxed manufacturing activity at the expense of untaxed fuel and agriculture improves efficiency in that 
country. 
The final column in Table 4 reports the combined efficiency impacts of intermediate import 
taxes, primary factor taxes (subsidies), and export taxes (subsidies).  (These were suppressed in 
equation (7) for the sake of brevity.)  The negative efficiency contribution in the US derives from land 
and capital subsidies for program crops and dairy export subsidies, whereas agricultural export taxes 
in Brazil play a key role in the positive welfare contribution in that country. 
Next, turn to Table 5, which reports the aggregate welfare effects, by country, decomposed 
into their efficiency and terms of trade components.  The aggregate efficiency effect is simply the 
summation of the results reported in Table 3. This permits us to explain the efficiency loss in the USA 
                                                 
14 This includes the Chilean value-added taxes which are most naturally modeled as a consumption tax. 
15 The negative number for Argentina results from the apparent exemption of imported oil products from 
consumption taxation.  This appears to be an error in the original data base for that country.   23
and Venezuela.  In Venezuela, this is caused by net trade diversion, whereas in the USA it is due to 
expansion of the subsidized agriculture sector.   
We turn next to the terms of trade effects (the second pair of columns in Table 5).
16  Ceteris 
paribus, expect these effects to be largest (relative to export volume) in those countries where exports 
surge the most. Thus it is no surprise that the terms of trade deteriorate for Colombia and Peru, as 
these are countries with very high average tariffs that must export more to affect the large increase in 
import volume. The terms of trade also deteriorate for Canada, Mexico, Argentina and Other South 
America.  The TOT deterioration for Mexico and Canada may be understood by the fact that these 
countries currently enjoy tariff free access to the largest market in the region for many of their 
products. When the FTAA is introduced, other countries obtain the same benefit and they displace 
Mexican and Canadian imports. The same general phenomenon explains why Argentina’s terms of 
trade decline. Of course, one region’s TOT loss is another’s gain, and Other Central America is one of 
the regions showing a strong TOT gain.  In this case, it is the strong increase in exports that is driving 
the import growth reported in Table 2. 
Another dimension of this analysis of uncertainty in the terms of trade effect can be observed 
in Figure 2. In this figure, we show how uncertainty in each FTAA region’s average export demand 
elasticity translates into uncertainty in the export price component of their terms of trade (see 
McDougall, 1992 for details on the terms of trade decomposition). Countries that rely heavily on 
exports of commodities whose substitution elasticities of trade are highly uncertain (e.g., Colombia) 
are exposed to a great deal of uncertainty in the size of their average export demand elasticity 
(horizontal axis of Figure 2) and tend to experience more uncertainty in the export price component of 
their terms of trade (vertical axis). Venezuela is an exception to this rule. It exhibits a high degree of 
uncertainty in export demand elasticities due to a heavy reliance on oil and gas exports, which are 
                                                 
16 For purposes of this table, we have expanded the terms of trade effect to include the effect of changes in the 
prices of the savings and investment goods in addition to the traditional changes in the prices of merchandise and 
services.   24
large and rather uncertain (recall Table 1). On the other hand, the variation in the export price 
component of its terms of trade is relatively small, due perhaps to the relative homogeneity of this 
product and the generally low tariffs on oil.  
We are now in a position to answer the question: Which countries gain from the FTAA? We 
see from the final two pairs of columns in Table 5 that ten of the thirteen FTAA countries gain from 
this free trade agreement based on the 95% confidence interval. On the other hand, Argentina and 
Other South America are shown to lose from the FTAA. In the case of Argentina, this is driven by a 
dominant, adverse terms of trade effect. For Other South America, both the terms of trade and 
allocative effects are negative.  
The welfare impact of the FTAA on the final country: Colombia is uncertain. This is an 
interesting case, since the component parts of their aggregate welfare impacts are “certain” in the 
sense that the 95% confidence intervals do not include zero. However, the positive allocative 
efficiency component is offset by an equally large negative terms of trade effect. So while the 
components of the welfare change are certain, the sign of their summation – the aggregate welfare gain 
– is uncertain. This type of uncertainty is not inherited from uncertainty about the model parameters 
governing substitution in trade. Rather, it relates to the presence of competing economic forces at 
work in the determination of the change in national welfare. 
There are many other variables in addition to the change in aggregate welfare that we could 
examine, particularly at the sector level. Here we focus our attention on employment, since the 
displacement of unskilled workers is often one of the most sensitive topics surrounding any free trade 
agreement. Table 6 summarizes the directional changes in unskilled employment, by sector, for each 
region. The first column reports the total number of sectors in which employment of unskilled labor 
rises and the second column reports the number in which employment falls. Since total employment 
remains unchanged, by assumption, the relative size of these two numbers is not very meaningful. 
However, it is interesting to ask how many of these changes are significantly different from zero at the   25
95% level. This is reported in the next column of Table 5. Here we see that the changes in 
employment are generally robust to the estimated variation in trade elasticities. We able to sign the 
change in sectoral employment at the 95% confidence level for every region in over 75% of the 
sectors. 
Table 7 reports the same employment results as Table 6, with the focus shifted to employment 
by sectors across all of the model regions. This allows us to evaluate how the uncertainty in sectoral 
trade elasticities translates into uncertainty about the employment effects for a given sector. Here we 
see that for all but five of the forty-two sectors, we are confident in the direction of change in 
employment for a given sector in seventy percent or more of the regions. The exceptions here are four 
primary commodities: paddy rice, wheat, other grains, and coal, as well as for processed rice. Not 
surprisingly, these sectors have some of the largest standard deviations relative to the size of the 
estimated elasticity (recall Table 1).   26
7. Summary and Conclusions 
Computable General Equilibrium analysis is often criticized for its lack of econometric 
foundations (McKitrick, 1998). The goal of this paper is to show that it is indeed possible to provide 
substantial statistical underpinning to policy analyses conducted using the CGE framework. We focus 
our attention on analysis of Free Trade Agreements – specifically, the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas – for which the key behavioral parameter is the elasticity of substitution among imports 
from different countries. This governs the extent to which non-FTAA regions will be displaced by the 
preferential reduction in tariffs on imports from FTAA countries.  
Historically, estimation of the import substitution elasticity has been difficult, due to 
insufficient observed variation in relative prices. In this paper, we capitalize on a unique data set and 
approach developed by Hummels (1999), in which variation in bilateral transport costs is combined 
with bilateral tariff variation in order to enhance the observed variability of relative prices for imports 
from different sources in six FTAA countries and one non-FTAA country. Elasticities are estimated at 
the GTAP commodity level to facilitate subsequent incorporation into our CGE model. The resulting 
estimates of the elasticity of substitution among imports are all significant at the 95% level. These 
estimates, together with their standard errors, are used in the subsequent policy simulations.  
The FTAA analysis takes explicit account of the fact that we do not know the true trade 
elasticities with certainty. Rather, we sample from a distribution of parameter values, constructed 
based on our econometric results. The outcome of this systematic sensitivity analysis is a distribution 
of model results, from which we can construct confidence intervals with which to answer the basic 
question posed in the title of this paper. We find that imports increase in all regions of the world as a 
result of the FTAA, and this outcome is robust to variation in the trade elasticities. Ten of the thirteen 
FTAA regions experience a welfare gain in which we are more than 95% confident. Two regions, 
Argentina and rest of South America experience welfare losses as they are displaced from existing 
markets in which they currently enjoy preferential access. Finally, the welfare impact of the FTAA on   27
Colombia is uncertain due to offsetting efficiency and terms of trade effects. We also examine the 
robustness of our employment effects. With the exception of several primary products, where the trade 
elasticity is relatively uncertain, we can be confident in the sign of the sectoral employment effects in 
the majority of regions.  
Of course all of these findings are conditional on the underlying model structure, as well as the 
other parameters employed in the CGE analysis. Variations in that structure will change both the 
econometric procedures as well as the CGE model itself. Given the uncertainty surrounding the 
appropriate structure for international trade modeling, and the diversity of outcomes that such changes 
in structure can engender, we must view the confidence intervals in this paper as being on the 
conservative side. Future work should focus on discriminating among these alternative model 
structures for purposes of establishing a firmer foundation for CGE analysis of trade policies (e.g., 
Hummels and Klenow, 2002).  
In summary, we conclude that there is great potential for combining econometric work with 
CGE-based policy analysis in order to produce a richer set of results that are likely to prove more 
satisfying to the sophisticated policy maker. In the end, decision makers and their advisors 
increasingly ask: How robust are the policy findings? In this paper we have found that some of the 
FTAA conclusions are robust, while others are not. This is important information for those seeking to 
make key political decisions based in part on results from quantitative economic models.   28
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Table 1. Elasticities of Substitution among Imports from Different Sources 
 
Code Description  Original 
Elasticity 
Estimated 
Elasticity  SD  Num 
Obs 
PDR Paddy  rice  4.4  10.1*  4.0  26 
WHT Wheat  4.4  8.9*  4.2  32 
GRO  Cereal grains nec  4.4  2.6*  1.1  131 
V_F Vegetables,  fruit,  nuts 4.4  3.7*  0.4  1,199 
OSD Oil  seeds  4.4  4.9*  0.8  239 
C_B  Sugar cane, sugar beet  4.4  N/A  N/A  3 
PFB Plant-based  fibers  4.4  5.0*  2.4  71 
OCR Crops  nec  4.4 6.5*  0.4  1,796 
CTL  Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, 
horses  5.6 4.0*  0.7  156 
OAP Animal  products  nec 5.6  2.6*  0.3  813 
RMK Raw  milk  4.4  N/A  N/A  - 
WOL  Wool, silk-worm cocoons  4.4  12.9*  2.7  76 
FOR Forestry  5.6  5.0*  0.7  529 
FSH Fishing  5.6  2.5*  0.6  527 
COL Coal  5.6  6.1*  2.4  71 
OIL Oil  5.6  10.4*  3.8  56 
GAS Gas  5.6  34.4*  14.3  8 
OMN Minerals  nec  5.6  1.8*  0.3  1,584 
CMT  Bovine meat products  4.4  7.7*  1.9  211 
OMT Meat  products  nec 4.4  8.8*  0.9  411 
VOL Vegetable  oils  and  fats 4.4  6.6*  0.7  717 
MIL Dairy  products  4.4  7.3*  0.8  547 
PCR Processed  rice  4.4  5.2*  2.6  62 
SGR Sugar  4.4  5.4*  2.0  156 
OFD Food  products  nec 4.4  4.0*  0.1  6,917 
B_T  Beverages and tobacco products  6.2  2.3*  0.3  998 
TEX Textiles  4.4  7.5* 0.1  14,375 
WAP Wearing  apparel  8.8  7.4*  0.2  9,090 
LEA Leather  products  8.8 8.1*  0.3  3,457 
LUM Wood  products  5.6  6.8*  0.2  4,120 
PPP  Paper products, publishing  3.6  5.9*  0.2  6,597 
P_C  Petroleum, coal products  3.8  4.2*  1.1  344 
CRP  Chemical, rubber, plastic products 3.8  6.6*  0.1  61,603 
NMM  Mineral products nec  5.6  5.8*  0.2  6,240 
I_S Ferrous  metals  5.6  5.9*  0.3  5,524 
NFM Metals  nec  5.6  8.4*  0.4  3,194 
FMP Metal  products  5.6  7.5*  0.2  9,926 
MVH  Motor vehicles and parts 10.4  5.6*  0.3  2,238 
OTN  Transport equipment nec 10.4  8.6*  0.4  1,843 
ELE Electronic  equipment 5.6  8.8*  0.2  8,916 
OME  Machinery and equipment nec 5.6 8.1*  0.1  44,386 
OMF Manufactures  nec  5.6 7.5*  0.2  7,586 
*Estimate Significant at 95% Confidence Level. 
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Table 2. Percentage Change in Aggregate Imports: Mean, 95 % Confidence Interval, and Coefficient 
of Variation 
                       .  




Lower       Mean          Upper
  Total  
        Imports 









1.57 0.10 1.17 
USA  2.07 2.19 2.31 0.03 0.10 
Mexico  7.36 8.38 9.39 0.06 0.06 
Central  
America  10.76 11.16 11.56 0.02 0.01 
Colombia  9.22 10.37 11.51 0.06 0.22 
Peru  7.93 8.41 8.89 0.03 0.16 
Venezuela  4.69 4.81 4.93 0.01 0.18 
Other 
Andean 
Pact  4.65 5.39 6.12 0.07 0.24 
Argentina  4.13 4.26 4.39 0.02 0.12 
Brazil  8.07 8.33 8.58 0.02 0.18 
Chile  5.39 5.51 5.64 0.01 0.17 
Uruguay  2.04 2.24 2.45 0.05 0.80 
Other 
South 
America  5.68 5.98 6.27 0.03 0.01 
Asia- 
Ocenia  -0.32 -0.31 -0.31 -0.01 -0.11 
European 
Union  -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.01 2.01 
Other 
Europe  -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.01 -0.10 
Mid-East 
and Africa  -0.29 -0.27 -0.25 -0.04 -0.10 
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Table 3. Components of Allocative Efficiency Effects Due to FTAA ($US million):  Mean 
and Coefficient of Variation (CV) 
 
       Imports          Consumption       Production   Other 
Region      Mean         CV            Mean         CV        Mean        CV    Mean 
 
Canada  760.60 0.12  246.40 0.11 40.78 0.21  -212.06
USA  545.25 0.06  -0.01 -0.23 -74.44 -0.09  -495.42
Mexico  975.35 0.19  2.50 0.29 174.80 0.23  103.37
Central  
America  322.05 0.05  217.79 0.05 -10.58 -0.15 -8.56
Colombia  508.55 0.10  15.38 0.08 4.22 0.23  98.54
Peru  9.35 0.15  23.68 0.08 -2.69 -0.38  123.03
Venezuela  -10.50 -0.09  2.83 0.08 0.00 -0.13  1.44
Other 
Andean 
Pact  17.26 0.17  11.48 0.13 -5.12 -0.39  22.83
Argentina  32.61 0.08  -0.19 -0.80 -0.23 -0.02 -29.45
Brazil  148.88 0.04  431.82 0.02 -10.62 -0.17  788.52
Chile  -15.69 -0.06  33.40 0.03 -5.46 -0.04  9.40




q  -1.04  7.64 0.19 -1.56 -0.03 -2.72
Asia- 
Ocenia  -252.95 -0.07  -34.53 -0.03 46.53 0.09  -362.48
European 
Union  -226.71 -0.06  -120.41 -0.05 60.52 0.03  -407.48
Other 
Europe  -49.62 -0.04  -15.67 -0.04 6.17 0.08  -42.99
Mid-East 
and Africa  -66.17 -0.07  -10.27 -0.10 1.91 0.17  -14.03
                                                 
q Results in italics indicate a result for which the confidence interval encompasses zero, i.e. it is not robust 
to direction of change under parametric uncertainty.   36
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Canada 1.00  25.54 0.08 0.00 0.93  0.93
USA 18.20  450.01 0.08 0.00 0.93  0.93
Mexico 2.70  71.77 0.08 0.00 0.93  0.93
Central  
America 0.01  0.28 0.08 0.00 0.93  0.92
Colombia 0.30 8.12 0.08 0.00 0.99  0.96
Peru 0.04  1.19 0.08 0.00 0.81  0.97
Venezuela 0.07  1.82 0.08 0.00 0.93  0.81
Other 
Andean 
Pact 0.01  0.42 0.08 0.00 0.81  0.91
Argentina 1.28  33.31 0.08 0.00 0.93  0.81
Brazil 4.54  106.97 0.08 0.00 0.96  0.92
Chile 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.96
Uruguay 0.02  0.58 0.08 0.00 0.93  1.00
Other 
South 
America 0.00  0.11 0.08 0.00 0.94  0.93
Asia- 
Ocenia -16.14  -189.46 0.08 0.08 0.94  0.93
European 
Union -23.41  -284.15 0.08 0.08 0.93  0.92
Other 
Europe -1.19  -14.50 0.08 0.08 0.93  0.92
Mid-East 
and Africa  -0.80  -9.72 0.08 0.08 0.93  0.93
 
Total -13.356  202.303 n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.
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Table 5. Welfare Effects of FTAA Outcome ($US million) 
 
 
Allocative EV  Terms of Trade EV  EV Total  Welfare (% Change)   
Region  Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV 
 
Canada  835.71 0.13 -620.78 -0.12 167.18 0.26 0.03 0.26
USA  -24.61 -2.87 6244.82 0.04 6845.20 0.04 0.09 0.04
Mexico  1256.02 0.19 -1241.76 -0.12 78.02 1.29 0.02 1.29
Central  
America  520.70 0.05 855.32 0.04 1385.57 0.04 1.70 0.04
Colombia  626.70 0.09 -514.99 -0.07 41.95 0.60 0.05 0.60
Peru  153.37 0.03 -73.39 -0.06 62.72 0.11 0.11 0.11
Venezuela  -6.23 -0.18 82.92 0.16 110.38 0.11 0.15 0.11
Other 
Andean Pact  46.45 0.08 22.10 0.57 63.94 0.27 0.27 0.27
Argentina  2.73 1.56 -30.69 -0.51 -74.50 -0.28 -0.02 -0.28
Brazil  1358.59 0.03 548.33 0.10 1921.85 0.06 0.28 0.06
Chile  21.64 0.04 189.57 0.03 200.41 0.03 0.29 0.03
Uruguay  1.52 1.80 22.32 0.22 16.71 0.44 0.09 0.44
Other South 
America  2.75 0.30 -42.78 -0.06 -82.85 -0.04 -0.89 -0.04
Asia- 
Ocenia  -603.43 -0.04 -2625.12 -0.01 -3577.75 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01
European 
Union  -694.09 -0.05 -2383.01 -0.01 -3171.74 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02
Other 
Europe  -102.12 -0.04 -246.90 -0.05 -390.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Mid-East 
and Africa  -88.55 -0.07 -232.27 -0.18 -340.07 -0.14 -0.04 -0.14
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Table 6. Regional Employment Effects Due to FTAA 
 
  Number of Sectors with:   




Pct Results with 95% 
Confidence 
 
Canada  29 13  83% 
USA  31 11  88% 
Mexico  28 14  79% 
Central  
America  9 33  93% 
Colombia  20 22  88% 
Peru  18 24  88% 
Venezuela  22 20  88% 
Other 
Andean 
Pact  18 24  76% 
Argentina  22 20  90% 
Brazil  23 19  86% 
Chile  21 21  88% 
Uruguay  13 29  79% 
Other 
South 
America  19 23  83% 
Asia- 
Ocenia  19 23  81% 
European 
Union  17 25  88% 
Other 
Europe  16 26  86% 
Mid-East 
and Africa  17 25  81% 
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Table 7. Sectoral Employment Effects Due to FTAA 
  Number of Sectors with:   
Sector Employment  Increase  Employment 
Decrease 
Pct Results with 
95% Confidence 
Paddy rice  9 8  65% 
Wheat  6 11  59% 
Cereal grains  9 8  65% 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts  6 11  71% 
Oil seeds  10 7  76% 
Sugar   9 8  82% 
Plant-based fibers  4 13  71% 
Other Crops  7 10  76% 
Cattle  12 5  76% 
Animal products  9 8  94% 
Raw milk  8 9  94% 
Wool  7 10  88% 
Forestry  8 9  82% 
Fishing  9 8  94% 
Coal  4 13  59% 
Oil  8 9  82% 
Gas  8 9  82% 
Minerals  12 5  76% 
Bovine meat products  13 4  82% 
Other meat products  7 10  88% 
Veg. oils and fats  11 6  94% 
Dairy products  6 11  100% 
Processed rice  8 9  35% 
Processed sugar  10 7  76% 
Food products   8 9  100% 
Bev. and tobacco   10 7  88% 
Textiles  7 10  94% 
Wearing apparel  9 8  88% 
Leather products  11 6  100% 
Wood products  7 10  82% 
Paper products  8 9  100% 
Petroleum, coal 
products  8 9  71% 
Chemical, rubber, 
plastic products  6 11  100% 
Mineral products  9 8  88% 
Ferrous metals  5 12  100% 
Metals  9 8  100% 
Metal products  7 10  94% 
Motor vehicles and 
parts  5 12  100% 
Transport equipment   12 5  100% 
Electronic equipment  7 10  100% 
Machinery   6 11  94% 
 